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Abstract 
This essay extends a cooperative game-theoretic model of balance of power in anarchic 
international systems to include considerations of the asymmetry which geography 
occasions in the offensive and defensive capabilities of countries. The two 
substantive ideas which concern us are a formalization of the notion of a "balancer" 
and that of a "central power." What we show is that in stable systems, only specific 
countries (such as Britain in the 1 8th and the 1 9th centuries) can play the role of 
balancer, and that the strategic imperatives of a central country (e.g., Germany in 
the period 1 87 1 - 1 945) differ in important ways from those of "peripheral" countries. 
The Geographical Imperatives of the Balance of Power in 3-Country Systems 
The geographic location of a state in the world is of basic 
importance in defining its problems of security. It 
conditions and influences all other factors . . .  (and] 
regional location defines potential enemies and allies and 
perhaps even the limits of a state's role as a participant in 
a system of collective security [1943: 22-3] 
Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace
If a Soviet strategic planner could be granted one wish, it 
should be to move his country somewhere else [1 987: 277] 
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances
A fundamental difficulty with formulating a comprehensive theory of stability 
in anarchic international systems -- of systems devoid of exogenously imposed rules 
and institutions -- lies in the conceptualization of resources and military 
capability. In his early work on coalitions, the size principle, and the 
application of cooperative game theory to a formulation of balance of power, Riker 
[ 1962], for example, assumes that such systems are constant sum games in which 
winning coalitions are those which control a majority of resources. Much of the 
formal theorizing in the balance of power literature follows Riker's lead to the 
extent that it assumes that resources are additive across the members of a 
coalition, and that resources to attack one country can be used equally well to 
defend against an attack, or that those resources can be directed with equal 
effectiveness at any country (c.f. Zinnes, 1 970; Wagner, 1 986; Niou and Ordeshook, 
1986, 1987). Clearly, though, such assumptions about resources provide, at best, an 
analysis of special cases. Common sense tells us that, although a land army may be 
effective for attacking a contiguous adversary, it may be useless against one with 
even a modest water barrier; and a tenant of today's strategic thinking is that 
modern technology fundamentally changes the implications of such barriers and 
distance. In short, "Even in the post-World-War-II technologically advanced 
environment, geographic distance seems to represent a cost in the movement of troops 
which all but the most powerful states are unable or unwilling to pay" (Pearson, 
1974:455). 
This argument's implication is that formulations of balance of power in which 
resources are treated symmetrically, although valuable for an initial understanding 
of the problem, may mislead us about the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
stability, and may be inappropriate for interpreting historical events and 
processes. Indeed, profoundly important questions cannot be answered adequately 
unless geography is taken explicitly into account. Should we, for example, 
attribute Britain's role as "balancer" in the 1 9th century to the motives and 
diplomatic skills of key decision makers or to its unique geographical position with 
respect to the Continental powers? Waltz correctly observes that "The notion of a 
balancer is more a historical generalization than a theoretical concept" ( 1 979:1 64), 
but he goes further to assert that "Balance of power theory cannot incorporate the 
role of balancer because the playing of the role depends on such narrowly defined 
and historically unlikely conditions" ( 1 979:164). We should ask whether this view 
is justified. What precisely are the advantages of geographical distance? For 
example, should we attribute the unification of China at the end of the Warring 
States Period in 221 BC at the hands of a geographically "peripheral" as against 
central power as mere happenstance brought about by the fortuitous combination of 
military and diplomatic skill, or is it reasonable to hypothesize that such 
peripheral powers have an advantage over central ones? Can that part of Germany's 
special, threatening role in European power politics from 1871  to 1 945, which are 
seen as a consequence of its geographically central position, be understood 
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theoretically and generally? What are the implications for international stability 
of any decline in geography's importance, as occasioned by advances in the 
technologies of weapons systems? Can the removal natural barriers to warfare 
disadvantage individual states, but make international systems more stable? 
To answer such questions, this essay extends a game theoretic model of the 
balance of power (Niou and Ordeshook, 1 986) to incorporate the asymmetries 
occasioned by geography in the use of resources. Section 1 of this essay reviews 
our earlier model, with emphasis on the necessary and sufficient conditions it 
establishes for the two forms of stability -- system- and resource-stability. The 
first stability concept concerns the ability of national leaders to secure the 
sovereignty of their countries or the survival of their regimes. Thus, a system is 
system-stable if we predict that no country will be eliminated from the game and its 
resources wholly absorbed by others. The second notion of stability concerns 
possible changes in the distribution of resources that do not threaten sovereignty 
or survival. A system is resource-stable if it is system-stable and if we predict 
that there will be no reallocation of resources whatsoever. Section 2 introduces 
the notation we require to generalize this model in its treatment of resources for 
three-country systems. Although we prefer a more general n-country formulation, 
such an analysis presently lies beyond our grasp; but an analysis of the three-
country case does resolve essential conceptual issues. Section 3 offers our main 
theoretical results, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of 
stability which reveal the imperatives of geography. Section 4 interprets our 
results in terms of technological innovation and in the light of some key historical 
events, and, by focusing on the key notions of a balancing and a central power, it 
attempts to answer the questions about international stability which we pose 
earlier. An appendix gives the proofs of the results we introduce. 
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1 .  An Initial Model 
Because the processes within even a three-country system are complex, we must 
proceed with analytic precision, which requires some mathematical notation. First, 
with respect to n-country systems, we let S = { 1,2, .. . , n} denote the set of all 
countries, we let C � S be a specific coalition of countries, and we let r s (r1, 
r2, ••• , rn) be an n-tuple of resources, where r; denotes the resources controlled 
by country i. Naturally, we suppose that r; � 0 for all i, we let R; a { r'; I O � 
r'; � r;}. and for convenience we suppose that r1 � r2 � •.. � rn. Thus, (S,r) 
denotes an outcome or a state of the world. We also make use of the notation in 
which R = �); denotes the total resources controlled by all countries, and r(C)
i<S 
�); is the total resources controlled by the coalition C.
i<S 
This notation appears to imply a simple formulation of a cooperative n-person 
"international relations game" with this characteristic function: 
v(C) = 0 if r(C) < R/2
v(C) = R if r(C) > R/2
v(C) = R/2 if r(C) = R/2
The presumption of this formulation is that winning coalitions can secure any 
resource redistribution (I b ), including those in which minority coalitions are
eliminated, whereas minority coalitions can secure nothing ( l a). Blocking 
coalitions -- those with precisely half the resources -- can ensure only the status 
quo ( le). Of course, the inevitable implication of such a formulation is that 
unless one country controls all of the rt>sources or unless two countries each 
control half the resources, the anarchic system which v(C) models is inherently 
unstable. Because of its constant-sum character, such a game does not possess a 
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( l a) 
( l b) 
( le) 
core -- outcomes which cannot be displaced by some winning coalition. Instead, 
cooperative solution hypotheses such as the V -set, the strong bargaining set, and 
the competitive solution predict resource distributions in which coalitions with a 
majority of resources eliminate coalitions with a minority of resources (cf. 
Ordeshook 1 986). 
Expressions ( I  a)-( le), however, misspecify the strategic character of anarchic 
international systems if we assume that national leaders must also be concerned with 
the games which ensue after other countries are eliminated. In Kaplan's words 
( 1 979), national leaders must be certain that they avoid possibilities such as this 
one: " ... the weakest player, by joining a nearly predominant strong player, only 
creates a condition in which he will be the next victim." Similarly, Wagner ( 1 986) 
notes that "What is important for balance of power theory is whether states will 
find it in their interests to combine to eliminate other states. By reasoning 
backwards from endpoints of the (implicit) game tree, one can examine whether such 
choices are optimal ... " The model which this essay extends, which is itself an 
adaptation of Wagner's analysis, takes such strategic considerations explicitly into 
account. 
To specify a correspondingly appropriate cooperative game, we reqllire 
assumptions about the motives of national leaders and about the "rules of the game." 
Ignoring considerations of geography altogether, we list our earlier model's 
assumptions so which we can highlight the extension which we offer in the next 
section. First, we suppose that countries or national leaders must choose one of 
several actions. Their alternatives are, 
a l :  negotiate to cede resources to other countries, 
a2: aggressively act to secure resources from other countries, 
a3: negotiate to secure resources from other countries, 
a4: aggressively oppose the actions of other countries, 
a5: act neither to secure or to cede resources. 
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With these alternatives in mind, our previous analysis makes the following 
assumptions: 
A l: R is constant. 
A2: R is infinitely divisible and transferable among nations. 
A3: Country i E S is eliminated if r; = 0. 
A4: All decision makers have perfect and complete information, and the game's 
characteristics are common knowledge. 
A5: i prefers r to r' if r; > r';, provided that, as a direct consequence of r, 
it is not the case that i's resources can be reduced to zero. 
A6: For C and C' i;;; S, C can defeat C' if and only if r(C) > r(C'). If C 
defeats C', r(C') is transferred to C as specified by the members of C so 
that the resources now controlled by C equal r(C) + r(C'). 
A 7.  If a2 and a3 lead to otherwise identical outcomes, a3 is preferred to a2. 
AS. If, for disjoint C, C', and C", C attacks C' and C' attacks C", with 
r(C) > r(C') > r(C"), then C absorbs C', leaving C" unaffected. 
There are, of course, a great many substantive implications buried in these 
assumptions which are not necessarily consonant with all of reality. Because we 
discuss these implications in our earlier essays, however, we comment on only two 
here. First, our notation supposes that we can unambiguously identify the countries 
relevant to the analysis. Naturally, this is not always the case since we may be 
uncertain about which countries are relevant and which countries are mere satellites 
of another, without true sovereignty in the sense that they cannot express an 
independent foreign policy. Despite such operationalization problems, we should be 
prepared to be flexible in empirical applications of our model. We may prefer, for 
example, to exclude certain countries as a temporary convenience, as when we ignore 
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the role of the superpowers in the relations among smaller countries in studying 
regional economic matters, or when we exclude smaller countries to study superpower 
relations. Alternatively, we may decide that the superpowers have no conflicting 
interests in a situation, or any interest whatsoever, in which case we may choose to 
apply the analysis only to smaller countries. Or, to understand the constraints 
imposed by domestic politics, we might prefer to associate the members of S with 
key domestic political interests within a state. Second, the supposition that a 
country's resources can be represented by a single number is problematical. 
Certainly military capability, geographical advantages, population, size and 
robustness of an economy, and the degree of domestic political stability are all 
relevant resources; and each of these components even is difficult to measure by a 
single index (cf. Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1 972, as well as Organski and 
Kugler's argument for the use of GNP, 1 980). Elsewhere, we offer a measure of ri 
which depends on these specific factors: a country's military age male population, 
its ability to mobilize that population for conflict, its production of items that 
are key to any war effort -- coal, iron, and steel -- and its ability to project its 
military forces offensively and defensively (Niou, Ordeshook, Rose, 1 988). And 
although such variables should correlate with the ones we use, the fact that we do 
not use economic measures such as indicators of GNP yields a bias for measuring 
direct military capability rather than potential value to an adversary of successful 
threats. This bias, in turn, reveals an ambiguity in our analysis. In what follows 
we implicitly equate military capability and the resources a country might lose to 
an adversary in a conflict. In reality, however, a country with an inferior economy 
but with a superior armed force, might overwhelm its adversary and force the 
transfer of economic resources which greatly exceed the costs of achieving the 
current disparity in strength. Nevertheless, our argument about the conditions for 
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stability and instability can be more clearly developed if we assume that the 
concept of resources is unidimensional and unencumbered by complex substantive 
qualification. 
Even if we accept such qualifications as necessary compromises for the 
development of a formal analysis, it is important to realize how these assumptions 
preclude the full consideration of the implications of geography. Suppose, in 
particular, that countries i and j are separated by a natural obstacle (e.g., the 
English Channel). Then even if i's resources exceed j's, a system containing only 
and j may nevertheless be stable (in violation of A6 and AS) -- neither country may 
possess the offensive resources to overcome the other's defensive capabilities. 
Further, neither i nor j may be able to transfer resources to each other without 
some diminution in the value of the transferred resources (in violation of A l  and 
A2). It is considerations such as these which our extension in the next section 
seeks to accommodate. 
We should also comment on assumption A5 because it incorporates our 
conceptualization of the sequential game that nations play. Suppose that we are at 
some initial state of the world (S,r) and that a subsequent state (S' ,r') is being 
contemplated by the decision makers in S. Moving from (S,r) to (S' ,r') may involve 
a voluntary transfer of resources, the formation of certain coalitions, or a war. 
Thus, the evaluation of (S' ,r') yields an evaluation of the actions leading to it 
from (S,r); and predicting an action necessarily requires that we know how each 
decision maker evaluates (S',r'). But we must accommodate the fact that (S',r') is 
not necessarily the "end of the game" -- that other states of the world may follow 
from (S' ,r'). Thus, how one evaluates (S' ,r') depends on how one evaluates its 
consequences. To model this evaluation, we envision the following sequential 
situation: Beginning with (S,r), nations are free to negotiate, war, transfer 
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resources, make threats, etc. Each transfer of resources, and each war results, 
according to rules yet to be specified, in a new state (S' ,r'). If we ignore for 
the moment the complication that such a process might proceed indefinitely, and 
suppose instead that decision makers hold finite planning horizons, then, owing to 
the assumption that everyone shares the same information about the situation and 
that everyone knows that everyone shares this information, then each decision maker 
can predict (up to the determinism which game theory admits) the states of the world 
in the sequence including the prediction that certain states lead to Its eventual 
elimination -- and no decision maker has any advantage in making such predictions. 
It also follows that, from any initial state, each decision maker can predict (again 
up to the determinism which game theory admits) whether a successive state will lead 
to its eventual elimination. 
The qualification "up to the determinism that game theory admits" accommodates 
the fact that if, for example, three persons, I ,  2, and 3, must divide some sum of 
money using majority rule, if these persons are identical except for their labels, 
and if all three are concerned solely with the amount that they possess (if they are 
each unconcerned about the welfare of anyone else), then we can say only that two 
persons will coalesce to divide the sum among themselves, excluding the third. We 
cannot say whether this coalition will involve persons 1 and 2, or I and 3, or 2 and 
3. The likelihood -- indeed the certainty -- of this indeterminism means that 
neither the analyst nor any decision maker can predict with certainty the outcomes 
that follow from a particular state (S' ,r'). But the assumption that the properties 
of the game being played are common knowledge implies that all participants will 
make the same predictions, even if those predictions merely identify a set of states 
that a particular initial description makes feasible. 
Suppose, then, that a decision maker is evaluating two alternative states 
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(S',r') and (S",r"). which he can block or bring about if he adopts certain actions 
or strategies. The indeterminism of which we speak implies that he cannot be 
certain what states follow from these two, but suppose that (S",r") makes feasible a 
state of the world in which the decision maker in question is eliminated, whereas 
(S' ,r') does not. That is, suppose that if (S" ,r") prevails and if everyone acts in 
accordance with the rationality principles yet to be specified, then the decision 
maker in question cannot preclude the possibility that he is eliminated at some 
point in the future if not in (S",r") itself -- suppose the security level of 
(S",r"), denoted s(S" ,r"), is zero -- but if everyone acts rationally with (S' ,r') 
as the starting point, then our decision maker knows that if everyone else responds 
rationally to the actions of everyone else, he can ensure his continued existence 
suppose s(S' ,r') > 0. Then our first assumption about preferences is that the 
decision maker prefers (S',r') over (S" ,r"). Second, if s(S',r') = s(S',r') = 0, 
then the decision maker is indifferent. Finally, we assume that if neither s(S',r') 
nor s(S",r") are zero, then the decision maker prefers (S',r') to (S",r") if his 
resources in r' exceed his resources in r". This is the essence of assumption AS. 
Thus far, our assumptions, although specifying the rules of a cooperative n­
person game, are not sufficient for defining a characteristic function, v(C), to 
which we might apply some solution hypothesis and render a prediction. In 
particular. we need to specify each country's security value, given what its leaders 
believe will be the game that results if certain countries are eliminated. To 
specify v(C), then, we must also model bargaining and specify the conditions under 
which countries can ensure their sovereignty. Our approach is to modify the 
perspectives of a particular solution hypothesis, bargaining set theory (Aumann and 
Maschler, 1 964), so that it fits the problem at hand. 
Our modifications incorporate the following: First, unlike solution theory, we 
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are not necessarily identifying a set of "stable" payoffs to the players in the 
game. Rather, we are ascertaining whether specific countries or coalitions of 
countries will find it in their interest to upset a particular state of the world, 
the status quo (S,r). Thus, we are identifying the outcomes which can be reached 
from a particular starting point. Second, in the context of defining system-
stability which arises exogenously, countries are not required to defend what they 
get in r; rather, they are defending their sovereignty. Thus, to say that (S,r) is 
system-stable does not require that country i defend its share of resources, r;: 
instead, system-stability requires merely that i defend some nonzero payoff. It is 
in the separately considered context of resource-stability which we look at i's 
ability to defend the particular amount r;. Third, countries prefer resources that 
are secured through "negotiation" rather than through conflict (assumption A 7). 
Finally, no country should, if possible, allow another to secure a majority of 
resources since this implies the elimination of all but the predominant country. 
With these considerations in mind, we offer the following notation and 
definitions: Letting W denote the set of winning coalitions (coalitions which 
control more than half the total resources), W* denote the set of minimum-winning 
coalitions, and E(r) = uc, be the set of essential countries in S, given r (a 
CEW* 
country is essential if it is a member of at least one minimal winning coalition). 
Further, let C = (C, ... ) be a coalition structure which partitions the members of 
S into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions (the empty coalition, /, is always an 
element of C), and let (r,C) be a proposal consisting of a resource distribution and 
a particular coalition structure, then (ignoring geography) we define, 
Threat: (r',C') is a threat by C against C' with respect to (S,r), 
current status quo, if and only if (i) C, C' E C'; (ii) r(C) > r(C'); 
(iii) r'; = 0 for all i E C'; and (iv) r'i > ri for all j E C.
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And, in particular, (r',C') is a threat against i if i E C' E C'. Condition 
requires that C and C' both be disjoint coalitions in the coalition structure C'. 
This is only reasonable since if i attacks j, we can hardly say that i and j have 
coalesced to coordinate their strategies. Condition ii is borrowed from the idea 
that countries will attack others only if they anticipate being able to win; hence, 
C's resources must exceed the resources of C'. Condition iii requires that a threat 
is a proposal to eliminate attacked countries. Finally, condition iv states that 
the members of C coalesce to attack others only if, individually, each anticipates 
some gain in terms of increased resources from such an act. 
Counter Threat: (r",C") is a counter to (r',C') by K !: C'nC'' if and only 
if: (i) either C !;;; C* or CnC" t. 0, where C", C* E C"; (ii) (r'',C") is a 
threat to C*; and (iii) r"; preferred to r'; for all i E C" 
A counter threat by the collection K, then, is, according to conditions i and ii,  a 
proposal in which K is in both C' (the coalition which is being attacked) and C" 
(the coalition which is formulating the counter) that either threatens all the 
members of C (the originally threatening coalition) or that coopts one or more 
members of C. In addition, condition iii requires that all countries in the counter 
coalition, C", prefer the counter to the original threat. 
Viable Counter Threat: The counter threat (r'',C") is viable for i E K if 
and only if there is no C0 !: C"-{i} such that C0 has a threat, (r0,C0), 
against C* or C* + {i}, with r0j preferred to r"i for all j E C0• 
A counter threat is viable for one of the threatened members of C' if and only if 
i's coalition partners in the counter have some incentive to coalesce with i in the 
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sense that whenever they exclude i (to form C"-(i}), they cannot make a counter 
threat which they all prefer to the counter which they can make with i. Our final 
assumption now is the following: 
A9: i E S will not be eliminated from the game if and only if it has a 
viable counter threat to every threat. 
It follows by definition that (S,r) is system stable if and only if, for all i E S 
and for every threat against i, i has a viable counter threat. 
Our earlier analysis supposes that national leaders are free to negotiate for 
the transfer of resources among themselves or to threaten alliances for the forced 
reallocation of resources. But in taking such actions, each nation must make 
certain, if possible, that it does not permit a reallocation from the status quo in 
which it, at some future stage of the process, becomes a victim (as when some other 
nation secures over half of the available resources) .  From this perspective, we 
prove the following in the original presentation of this model with respect to a 
country's ability to ensure its survival: 
Theorem 1: (S,r) is system-stable if and only if S = E(r). 
To illustrate, consider the distribution ( 1 20,50,50,40,40), in which everyone 
is essential. For example, regardless of what threats and counters are made, 
country 4 or 5 can always transfer 30 units of resources to country I. Our 
assumptions imply that no nation will secure more than half the resources, and 
because nations prefer receiving resources "peacefully" rather than "aggressively," 
an allocation such as ( 1 50,50,50,40, I 0) represents an ideal point for I .  Notice, in 
particular, then, that the security levels of countries 4 and 5 are not zero (as 
represented in the usual simple-game characteristic function representation of this 
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situation), but are I 0 instead. 
For the special case which is especially germane to this essay, we have the 
following corollary for three-country systems: 
Corollary: If r; < R/2 for all i, then all three-country systems are 
system-stable. 
Briefly, the mechanism of system-stability here is straightforward since, with three 
countries, if no country is predominant, then every country can form a viable 
counter threat by offering to transfer enough resources to the largest country (or 
to the second largest if it is the largest which is being threatened) so as to 
render that country near-predominant. And with one country near-predominant, then, 
by assumption A6, no country will threaten and act aggressively towards another. 
Thus, because any country can be rendered near-predominant in a three-country system 
by any other country, system-stability is assured. 
Theorem 1 and the definitions of threats and viable counter-threats permit us 
to specify a more appropriate characteristic function for the analysis of resource 
stability. Briefly, if C is "winning" (if r(C) > R/2), and if f is any arbitrarily 
small positive number, then the characteristic function of a system-stable game is 
as follows: 
v(C) = r(C) + (R/2 - max [ ri ]) 
iEC 
if r(S-C) > R/2 - max ri, otherwise v(C) 
iEC 
R - f; and 
v(S-C) = r(S-C) - (R/2 - max [ r; ]) 
ieC 
if r(S-C) > R/2 - max r;, otherwise v(S-C) 
itC 




Resource-stability, now, means that there exists an allocation of resources 
which, given the preceding characteristic function, cannot be upset by any country 
or coalition. In the lexicon of game theory, this means that the game has a core. 
Our second result establishes that a non-empty core requires a special circumstance: 
Theorem 2: The cooperative game defined by expressions ( l a) and ( l b) has a 
non-empty core if and only if r; = R/2 for some i.  
Hence, resource stability is possible, but only if one country controls precisely 
half the resources. Otherwise, the game has no core and countries can cycle 
indefinitely, negotiating and renegotiating agreements (but without threatening the 
sovereignty of any player). 
This model is extended elsewhere (Niou and Ordeshook, 1987) so that it permits 
the resources of countries to grow at differential rates, and so that national 
leaders are allowed to invest their resources. Such an extension accommodates the 
criticisms of balance of power theory which Organski and Kugler [1980], for example, 
offers, and it permits us to consider some of the imperatives of preventive wars. 
Although we appreciate that a fully general model should take as many possibilities 
into account as is analytically feasible, we do not consider these extensions in 
this essay. Instead, we turn to a consideration of the implications of geography 
when the total resources in a system are fixed. 
2. Incorporating Geography
The essential feature of geography is that resources may be especially 
advantageous for defense as against offense, and they may be especially advantageous 
or disadvantageous when used to attack one country as compared to another. 
Germany's army in 1940 might be well suited for overwhelming France but not Britain 
even though France certainly had a more powerful army than Britain. But even if ill 
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suited for attacking across the Channel, that army was sufficient for repelling a 
counter-invasion by Britain. 
To accommodate such facts, let us reinterpret r as a summary of the defensive 
capabilities of countries, which can be applied offensively against another country 
only after they are discounted by some parameter. Let r;d;i denote i's offensive 
capabilities with respect to j, where 0 � dii � 1. Thus, as a modification of 
assumption A6, i can defeat j if and only if r;dij > ri, and j can defeat i if and 
only if ridii > r;. Thus, even if resources as represented by the r's are not 
equal, neither country may be able to defeat the other if the d's are sufficiently 
small. Notice an immediate important implication of this fact. If all d's are 
equal to I in three-country systems, either one country is predominant (controls 
more than half the resources) or all two-country coalitions are winning in the sense 
that they can overwhelm the third. But now the set of two-country winning 
coalitions, w•, is defined by {C I C c S, I C I = 2, Er;d;k > rk, k + i, j }. So if 
i<C 
the d's are sufficiently small, then w• is empty, whereas with an appropriate 
selection of discount factors only one or two coalitions may be winning. 
Conversely, we can interpret dii = dii = I as meaning that i and j are contiguous,
at least from the perspective of the technology of resources. If resources are 
ICBM's or are readily converted into such weapons, then even if countries are not 
geographically contiguous, they are contiguous to the extent that a distance of 500 
or 1000 miles is of little consequence. If all d's are I, then our analysis should 
reduce to the model we offer in the previous section. 
At this point we make a simplifying assumption which reduces the complexity of 
the conditions for stability that we offer later, but which does not impose any new 
conceptual constraint. Briefly, any asymmetry in the d's of the form dii > dii 
means that i has a technological advantage over j -- that i's resources are more 
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effective for attacking j than are j's resources for attacking i .  If no such 
asymmetric superiority exists, then d;i = dii for all i and j in S. We make the
assumption that, in this sense, the d's are symmetric (keeping in mind that our 
assumption implies nothing about the relation between dii and dik or between dii and
djk). 
To see how our earlier analysis is altered with this reformulation of 
resources, consider the three-country system with the initial resource distribution 
(140,120,40). If all d's equal I ,  this system is system- but not resource-stable. 
Suppose, however, that d12 = 1, d13 = d23 = .2. Then 2 cannot absorb 3, nor can 
absorb 3. But I can attack 2 without 3 being able to assist 2 in a viable counter -
- 3 cannot transfer sufficient resources to 2 so that 2 can defend against 1 nor can 
3 divert sufficient resources from I by attacking it. Thus, I absorbs 2, and with 
260 units of resources, it subsequently absorbs 3. Hence, even though it initially 
controls less than half the resources, country 1 is in fact predominant. 
Alternatively, (I 60,80,60) is wholly stable if d12 = d13 = 2/3 and d23 = . 7. To see 
this, notice that if 1 threatens to absorb 2 and become predominant, then 3 can 
joint 2 in a viable counter by attacking I .  If 3 attacks 1, I must hold d31r3 = 40 
resources in reserve to counter 3's attack, leaving it with insufficient resources 
to threaten 2. And because 2 cannot threaten 3, (160,80,60) is resource- and thus 
system-stable. So with geography taken into account, countries can become
predominant even if they do not control a majority of resources, and countries with 
a majority of resources need not be predominant. 
To proceed further requires one additional assumption about how a country can 
uses resources secured from other countries. In our earlier model, we assume that 
if i defeats j and absorbs all of j's resources, then i can target r; + ri resources
at k. But now we must decide whether i can target r;dik + rjdjk resources or (ri + 
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ri)dik resources at k. This is equivalent to asking whether i can absorb j's
resources into its own territory (in much the same way as Russia absorbed Germany's 
captured industrial plant after World War II) or whether it is merely the 
sovereignty of those resources which are transferred In the same way as the United 
States established military bases in Japan and Germany after that same war). If 
resources refer to territory, then the first assumption is appropriate, whereas if 
resources are physically transportable, then we should impose the second assumption. 
Thus, both assumptions are plausible, and we would prefer not having to choose 
between them. Indeed, a fully general model would give each country the choice. 
But the second assumption yields the simpler analysis (although it is merely 
algebraic and not conceptual complexity which distinguishes between them). Because 
this is our initial foray into accommodating considerations of geography, we abide 
by it. 
With this ambiguity resolved (by assumption) we turn to the issue of when a 
country can become predominant -- can threaten the sovereignty of others without 
confronting any viable counter threats. Without considering geography ,  the 
corollary to Theorem 1 tells us that in three-country systems, any attack by one
country on a smaller one threatens the third (unless the attacking country already 
controls over half the resources in the system), and, correspondingly, any attack by 
a country on another can be countered by a viable counter, in which case all three­
country systems are system-stable. But with geographical considerations, a country, 
say i, can become predominant if, first, upon the absorption of, say j's resources, 
overcome k. Second, if k cannot effectively assist j by transferring resources to 
j. And third, if k cannot assist j by attacking i directly (thereby causing i to
divert some share defending against k while attacking j). Formally, this yields the 
following revised definition of predominant: 
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Country i is predominant if and only if neither j nor k, acting alone or 
in concert, can formulate a viable counter threat to a threat by i that 
renders i predominant -- if and only if there exists a j E S-(i) such 
that: ( I )  (ri + r)dik > rk; (2) ridii > rkdkj + ri; and (3) ridij > rkdki 
+ ri . 
Correspondingly, i is near-predominant if with ri, i is not predominant, whereas i 
is rendered predominant if its resources are increased to ri + £, where f is any 
number greater than zero (in our earlier model, i is near predominant if ri = R/2). 
To generalize the model from Section 1 ,  it is useful first to verify that a two­
country (bipolar) system can be system- and resource-stable. In our earlier model, 
bipolar systems are stable if and only if both countries control an equal share of 
resources. Admittedly, such a "knife-edged" stability condition is a byproduct of 
our mathematics and of our failure to consider the uncertainty which confronts real 
decision makers in their assessments of resources. We should make certain, however, 
that incorporating geography does not destroy so fragile a condition, and the 
following remark covers this case: 
Remark 1: In two-country systems either one country is predominant or the 
system is both system- and resource-stable. 
To prove this remark. first suppose that country i has no threat against j (i cannot 
defeat j), in which case we must have ridij 5 ri = R - ri, or equivalently, ri 5 
R/( I + di) · Second, if j cannot defeat i, then ridii = (R - ri)dii < ri, or
equivalently, ri ?: Rdi/( I + dii). Putting the two equalities together, then, we
have R/( 1 + dij) ?: ri ?: Rdj/( I + diJ 
To see how this result relates to our earlier analysis, notice that if dii = 
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dii = I ,  then the inequality becomes 1 /2 ?: r/R ?: 1 /2, o r  simply ri = R/2. More 
generally, the inequalities in Remark 6.1 can be satisfied by an appropriate choice 
of ri only if the first term is at least as great as the third; otherwise we have a 
contradiction and system stability is impossible. Some simple algebraic 
manipulation shows, however, that R/( I + dij) ?: Rdi/( 1 + dii) implies 1 ?: djidij• 
which is an inequality that is necessarily satisfied, given the constraints on the 
d's that they not exceed I. Thus, system-stability is possible in bipolar systems
(as is resource-stability since both forms of stability are equivalent in bipolar 
systems). And not only ls system stability possible in bipolar systems after we 
take geography Into consideration, but Remark 6.1 establishes that stability no
longer requires a "knife-edged" equality of resources. For example, even if country 
1 has twice the resources of country 2, the system (( 1 ,2),(200, I 00)) is stable so 
long as d12 < .5 . 
We might be led to infer from this discussion of the bipolar case that the 
discounting of offensive resources occasioned by geography make both system- and 
resource-stability more likely -- that the constraints on the r's required to ensure 
a country's sovereignty are weakened. But this implication is an illusion. To see 
this we proceed by proving two lemmas. Our first lemma concerns only the issue of 
technological possibilities in the context of the viable counter-threats that 
countries can make, and it does not constitute a prediction about final outcomes. 
Letting S = {i,j,k), and letting C = {i,j) be any two-country coalition in W*, we 
define the function gi(C) to equal the maximum amount of resources which i can gain 
either from k alone or from k and j, such that i is not rendered predominant (the 
proof of this lemma and other formal results are presented in the appendix). 
Lemma 1: For (i,j} E W*, gi({i,j}) = (ri + rk - ridij)/( 1 + dij) 
= R/( l + dij) - Ti 
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To see that lemma I is consistent with our earlier model, let the d's equal I ,  
in which case gi({i,j}) = (ri + rk - r)/2. So, for example, if r = (120,100,80), 
then g1({ 1 ,2)) = g1( { 1 ,3}) = 30, which is to say that country I can expect to win at 
most 30 units of resources, since 2 and 3 can block I from becoming winning more and 
becoming predominant. Similarly, g2({ I ,2}) = g2({2,3}) = 50 and g3({ I ,3}) = 
g3((2,3}) = 70. (Notice that Lemma I does not depend on the assumption that dii = 
dii for all i and j.) This lemma, however, is not sufficient to establish necessary 
and sufficient conditions for system- and resource-stability in general, but with it 
we can establish the following result: 
Remark 2: If there are only two winning coalitions, say {i,j} and {i,k} 
in a three-country system, if dii > dik• and if i is not predominant when 
it absorbs either j or k, then the system cannot be system-stable. In 
particular, a stable two-country system will emerge without j. 
Suppose i is not predominant over j even if i controls ri + rk resources and that it 
is not predominant over k even if i controls ri + ri resources. Notice from Lemma I 
and the definition of gi that i gains something from each winning coalition. Since 
i is the sole pivot, it follows that there cannot be any counter to a threat by 
(i,j} to eliminate k or by {i,k} to eliminate j. It also follows from Lemma I that 
gi({i,j}) > gi({i,k}) if and only if dik > dii' so, in particular, i prefers a 
coalition with k if and only if dik < dij· Thus, in this instance, the core of the 
corresponding cooperative game is an outcome in which j is eliminated. 
This remark, in effect, states that if one country, i, holds a superior 
position over the other two in the sense that those two cannot coalesce to defeat i, 
then i will either become near-predominant or it will join in a coalition with the 
21 
country which is the more difficult for it to overcome which eliminates the 
remaining country. To illustrate this remark with a numerical example, suppose r 
(140,90, 70), and, to simplify matters, let dii = dii for all i and j (so no country 
possesses a technological superiority over another in its ability to translate a 
unit of resource into an offensive capability). In particular, let d12 = .5, d13 = 
.25, and d23 = .5. Hence, { 1 ,2} and { 1 ,3} are winning, but {2,3} is not winning. 
From Lemma I ,  g1({ 1 ,2}) = 60, whereas g1({1 ,3}) = JOO. Thus, I prefers a coalition 
with 3, and the final outcome is (240,0,60) - - 2 is eliminated. 
The preceding remark deals with a special case; moreover neither it nor Lemma I 
informs us as to the circumstances under which a country can become near­
predominant. Without considering geography, we know that a country is near 
predominant if and only if it controls precisely half the resources. Our next lemma 
establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for a country to be near-predominant 
when the d's in our model are taken into account: 
Lemma 2: For any i E S, i is near-predominant if and only if 
( I )  ridij = rAk = ri + rk; and (2) either dki = I or dki = dij = I .
In our earlier model, countries can ensure their existence and, hence, the 
stability of systems by forming viable counter-threats in which one country is 
rendered near predominant. If, for example, the initial resource distribution is 
(120,100,80), then, because no country has any incentive to let another become 
predominant, countries will act to block any threat which gives anyone more than 
half the resources. Indeed, country 3 can counter any threat by transferring 30 
units of resources to 1, which gives I its most preferred feasible alternative -­
half the resources without war. With the new distribution (150,100,50), I cannot 
threaten 2 or 3 since 2 and 3 would coalesce to forestall I from becoming
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predominant. And 2 cannot threaten 3, since this only leaves open the door for I to 
attack 2 or 3 and become predominant (assumption A6). Thus, ( 1 20, 1 00,80) is system­
stable because one country can be rendered near-predominant, whereas ( 1 50, 1 00,50) is 
both resource- and system-stable because one country is near- predominant. Lemma 2 
reveals the circumstances under which a country is near- predominant or can be 
rendered near predominant when geography is taken into consideration. Thus it is an 
important step towards establishing conditions for system- and resource-stability. 
The conditions of the lemma are also substantively important. If we suppose 
that dkj = I means that k and j are contiguous (and therefore that djk • I )  then a 
country is near-predominant only if the other two countries in the system are 
contiguous (dki = I) or if i is contiguous to both other countries (dki = d;; = I).
To the extent, then, that system- and resource-stability depend on the ability of 
countries to form viable counter-threats by rendering another country near­
predominant, the stability of systems depends directly on geography or on the 
technology of resources. 
3. System and Resource Stability 
We can now establish necessary and sufficient conditions for both types of 
stability. Keep in mind that without geographical considerations, all three-country 
systems are system stable (provided that no country controls more than half the 
resources). This stability is assured because every country necessarily controls 
enough resources to render someone near-predominant. Our lemmas permit us to 
establish a necessary and sufficient condition for system-stability when the d's are 
less than I, but now this condition gains in complexity. But, following the same 
logic as Theorem 1 ,  those conditions reduce to the following: either geography 
renders the three countries irrelevant to each other's security, or one country is 
near-predominant, or each country can, as a viable counter-threat, render another 
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near-predominant by the transfer of some appropriate sum of resources. 
Theorem 3: A three-country system is system-stable if and only if (I) w• = /; 
(2) for some i E S, i is near-predominant; or (3) for every i E S such that 
(j,k} E w•, there exists a C = (i,j} E w• such that (a) dii < dik• or (b)
(r; + rj)djk > rk and either dij = djk = I or d;k = I
With Theorem 3, as well as the definitions of near-predominant and predominant 
in mind, we can now redefine the characteristic function for the cooperative 3-
person game among countries thus: Assuming that all coalitions denoted by C contain 
two members, then v(S) = R and, 
v(i,j) = r; + ri and v(k) = r., if w• is empty or if i or j
are near-predominant; 
Clearly, no threats are possible if w• is empty, so trivially, there is a valid
counter to every threat, in which no country needs to cede or otherwise transfer 
resources to another. Similarly, if some i is near-predominant, then as in our 
earlier model, j and k cannot threaten each other for fear that i can become 
predominant (assumption A6), nor will i join in any coalition to threaten a third 
country since it knows that it will not be allowed to gain any resources in that 
coalition. Next, 
v(i,j) = r; + rj + 6 and v(k) = rk - 6 if {i,j} E w•
and if either i or j is near-predominant if i or j 
controls 6 additional resources, 6 < r k; 
(3a) 
(3b) 
If j is not near-predominant, but if it can join with k to eliminate i (if (j,k) E 
W*). then by Theorem 3, i can ensure that it loses no more than 6 by ceding 6 to j. 
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v(C) R and v(i, i E C) 0 otherwise. 
Having thus defined the characteristic function for a constant sum 3-person 
game, and assuming, as before, that a country is resource-stable if and only if that 
3-person game has a core, then, 
(3c) 
Theorem 4: A three-country system is resource-stable if and only if w• is
empty or if there is an i E S such that i is near-predominant. 
Thus, a three-country system is resource stable if and only if the d's are 
sufficiently small so as to render each country essentially irrelevant to the 
others, or if the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied -- which excludes systems of 
three noncontiguous but nevertheless jointly relevant countries. 
4. Implications: Balancers and Central Powers 
Perhaps the most important implication we can draw from our analysis is that 
once we take geography into account, not all three-country systems are necessarily 
system-stable. Theorem 3 leaves open the possibility that whenever all d's are not 
equal to I -- whenever geography matters -- system-stability depends on the specific 
character of geographical dissimilarities. Indeed, that theorem tells us that 
whenever there is discounting between all pairs of countries owing to geography, 
then as long as that discounting is  not so great as to render each country a 
separate "system," system-stability among three countries Is impossible. 
With this in mind, it is reasonable to speculate that World War II ended the 
applicability of the logic of the diplomatic imperatives which dictated great power 
international politics in the 1 8th and 19th centuries. The histories of those 
centuries, as well as the first half of ours, are commonly described as a constant 
process of negotiation and balancing, in which stability, if it existed at all, 
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existed solely because of the constant efforts and diplomatic skills of key decision 
makers. To the extent that negotiation and balancing, as well as the striving for 
advantage, were conscious objectives, we can surmise that participants perceived no 
natural stability to their systems. If there was a natural stability, then 
certainly it should not have been so difficult and skillful to achieve, nor so 
fragile that it lead to major wars. But modern technology should alter strategic 
considerations. We might reasonably conjecture that the threat of Russian dominance 
on the continent serves as the chief unifying factor -- that this threat submerges 
destabilizing competition. However, we can also speculate that to the extent that 
Britain, France, and Germany (West, East, or both) are now rendered contiguous by 
technology, system stability is assured with or without a Soviet threat. 
With our attention focused on Europe, it is interesting to see also how our 
analysis explains why Britain in particular is credited with playing the role of 
balancer in earlier centuries. It is tempting to attribute this role to the goals 
of its leaders and its business elites. But if that is our explanation, then we 
must also explain those goals. Short of pursuing a complete theory of history, we 
note simply that Britain alone is separated from the continent by any meaningful 
natural barrier, whereas the remaining key actors at the several important 
historical periods are essentially contiguous. (Napoleon's drive on Russia was not 
with a contiguous adversary, as his defeat reveals, but it is only when he 
challenged Britain's security by challenging contiguous adversaries did Britain 
become a central actor). So if we look at Lemma 2, we see that only Britain can be 
a near-predominant country -- explicitly or implicitly ceding resources to any other 
country cannot ensure stability (Russia, which we might also conceptualize as being 
non-contiguous was simply too economically backward and too weak to play Britain's 
role of becoming near-predominant). This is not to say that other countries cannot 
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become predominant through technology or by the miscalculation of others. However, 
Britain's special geography rendered it a particularly distinctive coalition 
partner: it alone could be rendered near-predominant (which in reality, owing to 
uncertainly and the like, is a less precise concept which our theory presumes) 
without fear that miscalculation could render it predominant. 
This discussion, though, does not directly contradict Waltz's assertion, noted 
earlier, that the role of a balancer cannot be formally incorporated into the 
analysis. To see, however, that this assertion is incorrect consider the following 
definition of a balancer which incorporates two ideas: first, the country in 
question, i, must be capable of determining which of the two coalitions of which it 
can be a member is winning (it must be able to ensure the defeat of either potential 
aggressor); second, the system must be system-stable so as to preclude the 
possibility that i is not merely a potentially predominant country; and, finally, 
the system should not to be resource-stable in order to assure that there are some 
incentives for the formation of coalitions. 
Country i is a balancer in (S={i,j,k},r) if and only if {i,j} and {i,k) are 
winning and (S,r) is system- but not resource-stable. 
Without geography as a consideration, of course, every country in a system-stable 
three-country system is a balancer. With the British case in the 1 8th and 19th 
centuries in mind as the phenomenon to be explained, what we are particularly 
interested in, though, are the circumstances, owing to geography, which place one 
country uniquely in this role. The following theorem, which follows largely as a 
corollary to the conditions for system stability which Theorem 3 establishes (see 
the appendix), tells us what we want to know: 
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Theorem 5:  Country i in S = {i,j,k) is  the unique balancer in (S,r) if 
and only if ( I )  dik = I (countries j and k are contiguous); (2) dii = dik 
= d < I (country i is not contiguous to either j or k); (3) d(ri + rk) < 
ri (the coalition {j,k} is losing and cannot defeat i); and (4) d(ri + ri) 
2::. rk and d(ri + rk) 2::. ri (coalitions {i,j} and {i,k} are winning). 
The implications of this theorem are profound, because it reveals that 
Britain's role was not the mere accident of skillful diplomacy or the realization of 
a particular diplomatic stance which other countries could have adopted as well. 
Instead, Theorem 5 suggests that Britain was uniquely positioned to play the role of 
balancer, and thus, to contradict Waltz, it provides a theoretical explanation for 
that role (we say "suggests" since our analysis presumes three countries rather than 
the six or so major powers that played on the stage of 19th Century European 
politics). This theorem also permits us to respond to the speculation that Britain 
played its role merely because it was "a status quo power" or that a tradition begun 
by Cardinal Wolsey's policies towards Bourbon and Habsburg monarchies were mere 
accidents of leadership. Rather, Theorem 5 turns the "causal arrow" around and 
suggests that it was such a power and that it enjoyed such leadership as a result of 
its unique natural position. (We note parenthetically that the rise of Germany's 
navy and Britain's involvement in a continental war destroyed this position, but it 
established a new peripheral power -- the United States, which played its role in 
two successive world wars.) 
Waltz ( 1 979:164) argues that Britain's role of balancer requires meeting three 
conditions: "The first of these was that the margin of power on the side of the 
aggressor not be so large that British strength added to the weaker side would be 
insufficient to redress the balance . . .  the second condition was that Britain's ends 
on the continent remain negative, for positive ends help to determine alignments . . .  
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Finally . . .  Britain required a status in power at least equal to that of the 
mightiest." Waltz's first condition corresponds to (4) in the theorem; the meaning 
of his second condition is unclear, except perhaps to require geographical 
remoteness -- condition (2); but Waltz's last condition is clearly incorrect. 
Morgenthau, however, comes closer to tapping the intuition behind Theorem 5: 
"Britain was capable of making its beneficial contributions to peace and stability 
only because it was geographically remote from the centers of friction and conflict, 
because it had no vital interests in the stakes of these conflicts as such, because 
it had the opportunity of satisfying its aspirations for power in areas beyond the 
seas which generally were beyond the reach of the main contenders of power" 
( 1 966:340) Although only the first of Morgenthau's three conditions concern Theorem 
5 (his last two certainly contributed to British motives), his observations about 
European politics in general reach the other conditions of the theorem: "Both naval 
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supremacy and virtual immunity from foreign attack for more than three centuries 
enabled great Britain to perform this function [condition (3)) ... Air power has . . .  
put an end to [this] invulnerability . . .  " (p. 337). "France under Louis XIV and 
Italy in the decade before the First World War attempted to play this role . . .  but 
France was too deeply involved . . .  lacking in commanding superiority [in violation 
of conditions (2) and (4)). Italy on the other hand had not enough weight to throw 
around to give it the key position in the balance of power [in violation of 
condition (4)]" (p. 1 88).
To see further the advantages which a peripheral, balancing power enjoys, 
suppose r = ( 1 50,75,75), let dii = dii for all i and j, and in particular let d12 = 
d13 = . 5 ,  and d23 = I. In this instance, 1 and 2 could threaten to divide 3's 
resources evenly, and 3's only viable counter is to transfer 50 units to 1 so as to 
make I near-predominant. Neither 2 nor 3, alone or together, however, can threaten 
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I .  And if either coalesces with I to attack the third, the third should immediately 
cede 50 units to I since any gain by 2 renders 3 inessential, and vise versa. In 
this instance, then, the cooperative game has a core which yields the outcome 
(200,25,75) or (200,75,25). Thus, not only can geographically distinct countries 
such as Britain enjoy a greater level of resources without threatening the stability 
of systems, they are also the countries to which resources will be ceded when 
another must ensure its survival. 
The position Britain enjoyed as a balancer, however, is not the sole asymmetric 
possibility which geography occasions. Consider the following observation by 
McNeill ( 1 982:1 48): 
States located towards the margins of the European world -- Great Britain 
and Russia in particular -- were able to increase their control of 
resources more rapidly than was possible in the more crowded center. The 
rise of such march states to dominance over older and smaller polities 
located near the center where important innovation first concentrated is 
one of the oldest and best-attested patterns of civilized history . . . .  
(such) states conquered older, smaller polities at least three times in 
the ancient Near East: Akkad (ca. 2350 B.C.); Assyria (ca. 1 000-6 1 2  B.C.); 
and Persia (550- 33 1  B.C.). Mediterranean history offers a similar array 
of instances: the rise of Macedon (338 B.C.) and then of Rome ( 1 68 B.C.) 
in classical times followed in modern times by the Spanish Dominion over 
Italy (by 1 5 57) ... . Ancient China (rise of Ch'in 22 1 B.C.) and ancient 
India (rise of Magadha, ca. 321  B.C.) as well as Amerindian Mexico 
(Aztecs) and Peru (Incas) all seem to exhibit a parallel pattern. 
To see how this recurring historical pattern finds reflection in our analysis 
consider a system in which d12 = d13 = 1 but d23 < I .  Thus, country 1 is central 
it is contiguous to two non-contiguous countries, and again, from Lemma 2, it is 
the sole country which can enjoy a position of being near-predominant. But with 
Theorem 3 in mind, suppose r =  ( 1 00 , 100, 1 00) and d23 = .5.  Although ( 1 ,2} can 
threaten 3 (or, equivalently, { 1 ,3} can threaten 2), 3 can form a viable counter by 
ceding 50 units of resources to I so as to make 1 nearly-predominant. But if 2 and 3 
coalesce to attack I with the understanding that they will divide I 's resources 
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evenly, I cannot form a viable counter: if I propose a coalition with 2 (or 3) which 
offers 2 more than 1 50 units of resources at the expense of 3, then I has failed to 
i ncrease its security value since it can now be defeated by 2 alone, and 3 does not 
have sufficient resources to form a viable counter with I against 2 -- 2 is 
predominant. Nor can I propose to merely transfer 50 units of resources to 2, since 
such a transfer cannot make 2 near-predominant so as to render the system resource­
stable - - such a transfer merely weakens I further. 
Jn this example, then, the a central power must control more resources than 
either adversary in order to secure its survival. Remark 3, however, which follows 
from some simple algebraic manipulations on condition 3 of Theorem 3, shows that for 
the special case in which both such adversaries' (both "peripheral powers") 
resources are equal, the resources which the central power must control to ensure 
system stability depend on d, the discount between the two non-central powers. 
Remark 3: If ri = rk = r and dii = dik 
stable if and only if 2r 2: ri > r/djk - r. 
I ,  then ({i,j,k},r) is system 
If, as in our example, r = 100 and d = .5,  then ri must exceed 1 00; if d is 
less than .5, then ri must exceed something greater than 1 00; and if d is greater 
than .5,  then ri must exceed something less than 100. Thus, the greater the 
remoteness of the two peripheral powers, the greater are the resources which the 
central power must control to ensure that it is essential. If the resources of each 
peripheral power are nearly irrelevant to the other (if d << I ), then a central must 
do more than match the resources of its potential adversaries; otherwise that power 
is inessential and its two adversaries can coalesce to eliminate it from the game. 
The empirical manifestation of this example, then, could easily be the Bismark's 
Germany and the concern it felt about France and Russia. To the extent that we can 
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suppose that the resource discount between Russia and France was substantial 
(although not zero, as the Napoleonic invasion of Russia established), Germany was 
essential on the continent only if it controlled more resources than either Russia 
or France. This, in part, accounts for the necessity of an Austro-German alliance 
and for Germany's perceived need for military superiority. Within this framework, 
German interests were best served by a neutral Britain, or at least a Britain that 
did not side with a Franco-Russian alliance. Unfortunately, securing continental 
near-predominance endangers Britain's role as balancer: with Theorem 5 in mind, that 
role existed only insofar as a German continental hegemony did not threaten Britain 
directly. Thus, Germany was presented with the difficult task of forming alliances 
and increasing its resources so as not to undermine Britain's natural position and 
strategy. Whether this task was impossible or merely to difficult for the likes of 
a Tirpitz we cannot say. We suspect but cannot prove that the military armament 
policies which Germany pursued after Bismark were in fact a colossal blunder, and 
that, because Britain could no more tolerate a French or Russian hegemony that a 
German one, the extension of Bismark's policies to the 20th century would have done 
as much to ensured the survival of the German state. Jn any event, the outbreak of 
war in 1 9 1 4  reveals that the task was not accomplished. 
Our analysis does not apply, of course, if there are more than three essential 
actors, and thus we must leave it as a conjecture that the advantage of peripheral 
powers does not disappear as the number of countries increases. We suspect that 
Remark 3 (as well as Theorem 5) will generalize, but before we go too far in 
interpreting the historical events which McNeill summarizes as support for our 
analysis, we ought to keep in mind that just as there are a great many peripheral 
powers which supplant central ones, so there must be peripheral powers which have 
failed to do so. This too is consistent with our model in that, if a central power 
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anticipates events, then even if it is the power with the fewest resources, it 
should be able to meet threats with viable counter threats. Thus, if our theory is 
essentially correct, the eventual dominations which history records must follow from 
miscalculation, and we suspect that our analysis shows that miscalculation is more 
disadvantageous to a central power. Our example shows that a central power can, by 
skillful formation of alliances, maintain system-stability with fewer resources than 
peripheral powers. But if it fails to act appropriately by misjudging its 
adversaries' resources, then its resource inferiority dooms it to defeat. On the 
other hand, if it miscalculates by failing to heed the imperatives of balance of 
power as uncovered by our analysis and tries to ensure against such a possibility by 
seeking resource parity with its neighbors, then those neighbors should view events 
as a threat to stability and to their sovereignty. In this case we can anticipate a 
preventive war, which the central power loses. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: Since (i,j) E W*, i and j together can defeat k. But 
before i and j divide rk, j must make certain the i does not control enough 
resources to defeat j subsequently. If the addition of rk renders i predominant, 
suppose that i and j divide rk a and rk - a respectively. Then it must be the case 
that (ri + a)dij 5 rj + rk - a. This implies that a 5 (rj + rk - ridij)/( l + dij) .
So a is maximized when the statement of the lemma is true. The second inequality is 
established by setting rj + rk = R - ri and applying appropriate algebraic 
manipulations. QED. 
Proof of Lemma 2: If we add i > 0 to ri so that (ri + i)dij > rj + rk, for all
E S-(j) and k E S-(i,j}, then, by definition i is predominant. Thus, to prove 
sufficiency we must show that if the conditions of the lemma are satisfied, i is not 
predominant without the addition of i -- that every threat by i can be countered 
with a viable counter threat -- whereas i becomes predominant with i. Notice first 
that if ridij = ri + rk, then by lemma I ,  gi(C) = 0 for all C in W*, i E C. Thus 
cannot gain resources by coalescing with either j or k in a threat against the third 
country, so i cannot be predominant. However, if we add i resources to i, then 
(ri + t)dij > rj + rk and i is predominant. Second, if i threatens j and k 
together, let r0 i be the resources i allocates against j, in which case r idij = 
(ri - r0i)dij + r0idij = ridij. But if ridij = rj + rk, for all j E S-(i} and k E 
S-(i,j}, then d;i = dik• in which case we can rewrite the previous equality as 
(ri - r0;)d;k + r0;<l;j = rAi = ri + rk. So i cannot overcome j and k 
simultaneously, nor can it overcome one without rendering itself vulnerable to the 
other. Thus, i is not predominant. But if we add i resources to i, the previous 
equality becomes ">", and i becomes predominant, which means that it is near 
predominant without i. Finally, suppose i threatens j alone. If dkj = I, then ri + 
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rkdki = rj + rk = r;d;i' k can join j in a counter by attacking i, and, thus, i is
not predominant. But if € is added to i's resources, the last equality becomes "<" 
and k cannot join j in a viable counter by attacking i. Nor can k form a counter by 
transferring its resources to j. Such a transfer yields a viable counter only if 
ri + rk � r;ct ;j + €dij · Since € > 0, this requires that rj + rk > r;dij , which
violates the assumption of the lemma. So again, i is near predominant. Suppose, on 
the other hand, that dki = d;j = 1 .  Then if i threatens j, k can join j in a viable 
counter by attacking i. Country i must target more than ri of its resources at j 
and at least rk at k. If r ;  = ri + rk, this is impossible, whereas if t is added to 
i's resources, i has sufficient resources to defeat j and k. To prove necessity, we 
already know by definition that if r;dij > ri + rk, then i is predominant; so 
suppose that "<" holds. Buy lemma i, g;(C) > 0 for some C in w•, i E C. But 
cannot gain enough to eliminate its coalition partner subsequently since such a 
coalition agreement violates our model's rationality assumptions. Suppose, then 
that "=" holds. We are left with two cases. First, if dki < 1 and dki < 1 for some 
j E S-{i}, then r;d;j > ri + rkdki and r;d;j > ri + rkdkidij • in which case, by 
definition, i is predominant. Second, if dki < l and d;i < 1 for some j E S-{i}, 
then again r;d;j > ri + rkdkj and r;d;j > ri + rkdkidij · QED.
Proof of Theorem 3: It is evident that conditions ( I )  and (2) are sufficient.
To show that (3a) is sufficient, suppose (r',{j ,k},{i}) is a threat against i. From 
the definition of a threat, this requires that {j,k} E w•, r({j ,k}) > r;, r'; = 0,
and r'i > ri and r\ > rk. But if, as (3a) assumes, there exists a C" E w•, say 
{ i ,j} ,  such that dii < dik• then (r",{i,j},{k}) is a counter-threat to 
(r' ,(j,k},{i}) by i since C'nC'' = (j}, (r",{i,j},(k}) is a threat to k, and by Lemma 
1 ,  g/{i,j}) > gi({j,k}), so r" is preferred to r' by i and j .  That (r",(i,j},{k}) 
is viable follows from the fact that if j ,  by attacking k alone, gains more than 
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g/(i,j}), then from Lemma I (see proof), j becomes predominant. So i will act to 
prevent j from gaining more than g/(i,j}), which is to say that j alone cannot do 
better than with the counter-threat. To establish the sufficiency of (3b), notice 
that if i, when threatened by (r',{j,k},(i}), is in some winning coalition, say 
(i,j} such that the conditions of (3b) are satisfied, then i can transfer g/(i,j}) 
resources to j .  In this case, by Lemma 2, j becomes near-predominant and the
transfer is a counter. That i can transfer gi((i,j}) resources to j without setting 
its resources to 0 follows from the fact that (r; + ri)dik > rk, which implies that 
g/{j,k}) < r; - - otherwise, j is predominant when it secures gi({j ,k}), in 
contradiction of Lemma 1 .  It is a viable counter since, by assumption A 7, j prefers 
the transfer to securing an equivalent amount of resources by eliminating i, and 
since, by lemma I ,  j cannot gain more than gi({i,j}). To prove that the conditions
of the theorem are necessary, suppose (r,S) is not system stable, that w• is not 
empty, but i is not a member of any winning coalition. Then trivially, the winning 
coalition must be {j,k}, which can pose a threat to i that i cannot counter. 
Alternatively, if i is a member of some coalition in w•, say {i,j}, but du > djk•
then i cannot formulate a counter to the threat (r' ,(j,k},{i}), because i cannot 
offer j an amount that exceeds r'i = gi({j,k}) + ri. If d;k * I and d;i or djk * I ,  
then, by Lemma 2,  i cannot render j near-predominant. Finally, if (r; + ri)dik � 
rk• then i does not have enough resources to transfer to j to render j near­
predominant. QED. 
Proof of Theorem 4: That the conditions of the theorem are sufficient is 
trivial. To see that they are necessary, notice that if w• is not empty and if no i 
is near-predominant, then the corresponding constant sum game is essential. 
Referring to (3b), v(i,j) = r; + rj + li > v(i) + v(j) = r; + ri - 26. But if w• is 
not empty and no i is near predominant, then there exists a li > O that renders some 
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i predominant, so the game is essential. It follows from the fact that only 
inessential constant sum n-person games have non-empty cores, that the core is empty 
for situations described by the characteristic function in (3b) and that the system 
is not resource stable. 
Proof of Theorem 5: To prove sufficiency, notice that by Theorem 3 and the 
definition of a balancer, conditions ( I ), (2), and (4) imply that i is a balancer 
and the system is system-stable, whereas condition (3) implies that neither j nor k 
can be balancers. To prove necessity, notice, first, that if condition (4) is 
violated, then (i,j} and (i,k} cannot be winning an i cannot be a balancer. Second, 
if d(ri + rk) > r;. then i is not the unique balancer. Specifically, {j,i} and
{j,k} are winning: (j,k} is winning from the assumption that condition (3) is 
violated; and condition (4) implies that ri + dr; > rk, so {j,i} is winning. Third,
if condition (2) is violated and d;j = d;k = I, then, ceteris paribus, by condition
(3),  ri + rk � r;. In the case of strict inequality, i is predominant and the
system is not system stable; if equality holds, then, by Theorem 2, the system is 
resource-stable and no country is a balancer. Finally, if condition (I)  is violated
and dik is not equal to I, then, ceteris paribus, the system is not system-stable
(by condition 3b of Theorem 3). QED. 
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